LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
__________________________________
VOLUME 1

AUGUST 2014

ISSUE 2

_____________________________________
ARTICLE:
A PRIMER ON THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
THOMAS BECKET AFFAIR

R. Jason Richards

NOTES:
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: NO TRUE PRIVILEGE FOR
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
DE FACTO SEGREGATION: HOW IT IS AFFECTING AMERICA’S
INNER-CITY SCHOOLS

Rebecca Lee

Kimberly Grace

LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
__________________________________
VOLUME 1

AUGUST 2014

ISSUE 2

_____________________________________

BOARD OF EDITORS
2014-2015
Jacob D. Baggett
Editor in Chief
Jennifer N. McNeil
Executive Managing Editor
John Stirling Walsh
Executive Articles Editor
David Graham
Executive Notes Editor

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Aaron Kimsey

STAFF EDITORS
Joshua Dennis, Thomas McCauley, Lauren Mullins

FACULTY ADVISOR:
Matthew Lyon

ii

We would like to thank:

BOARD OF EDITORS
2013-2014
D. Chris Poulopoulos
Editor in Chief
Jeff Glaspie
Executive Managing Editor
Robert Simpson
Executive Notes Editor

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
David Gratz, Yardley Sawyer, C. Tyler Stafford

STAFF EDITORS
Jacob D. Baggett, David Graham, Aaron Kimsey, Jennifer N.
McNeil, John Stirling Walsh

FACULTY ADVISOR:
Matthew Lyon

iii

LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
© 2014 by the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review

__________________________________
VOLUME 1

AUGUST 2014

ISSUE 2

_____________________________________
ARTICLE:
A PRIMER ON THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE THOMAS BECKET
AFFAIR

145

NOTES:
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: NO TRUE PRIVILEGE FOR GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES

155

DE FACTO SEGREGATION: HOW IT IS AFFECTING AMERICA’S INNER-CITY
SCHOOLS

183

iv

LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
__________________________________
VOLUME 1

AUGUST 2014

ISSUE 2

_____________________________________

A PRIMER ON THE ORIGINS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THOMAS BECKET AFFAIR
R. Jason Richards*
Chorus: Here let us stand, close by the cathedral. Here
let us wait. Are we drawn by danger? Is it the
knowledge of safety, that draws our feet towards the
cathedral? What danger can be for us, the poor, the
poor women of Canterbury? What tribulation with
which we are not already familiar? There is no danger
for us, and there is no safety in the cathedral. Some
presage of an act which our eyes are compelled to
witness, has forced our feet towards the cathedral. We
are forced to bear witness.1
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the twelfth century controversy between
Henry II and Archbishop Thomas Becket. Although the struggle
The author is a partner in the firm of Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz in
Pensacola, Florida. B.A., B.A., University of Alabama at Birmingham; M.A.,
University of Colorado; J.D., John Marshall Law School (Chicago); LL.M.,
DePaul University College of Law.
1 Michael Scott Freeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented in
the American Context, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 801 (1990) (quoting T.S. Elliot,
Murder in the Cathedral 11 (1935)).
*
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between these two individuals occurred during the distant centuries
in medieval England, the ramifications of their conflict remains with
us today, both spiritually and legally. It is for this reason that we
explore this topic again.
II. CANON LAW
Before the Norman Conquest, the Catholic Church’s influence
was not widespread in England.2 As a result, there existed in England
a singular tribunal consisting of both the bishop and the Earl whose
responsibility it was to determine all controversies of legal
significance, both lay and ecclesiastical.3 Accordingly, no distinct
separation existed between church courts and secular courts prior to
the Conquest.4 Not only were the two courts closely linked, but
initially, the mood of the ecclesiastical courts and royal courts
generally was one of compromise and reconciliation.5 Over time,
however, the legal disputes between lay and ecclesiastical members of
the two competing establishments would become increasingly
contentious. This, in turn, lead William the Conqueror to carry out
the promise he had made prior to his conquest of England – to set up
separate ecclesiastical courts in England in exchange for the Pope’s
blessing of his ideological campaign.6 In doing so, he removed suits
“which belong to the government of souls” from lay tribunals to
ecclesiastical tribunals, thereby permitting the legal separation of the
two courts.7 It was through this division that William, perhaps
unintentionally, set in motion the struggle between church and state
courts that would last well beyond his reign.8 William’s approach
disrupted the traditional cooperative atmosphere that had previously
existed between bishops and laypeople.9 Before William’s reign,
ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 40 (New
York: P.F. Collier & Sons, 1939).
3 W.R. Jones, The Two Laws in England: The Later Middle Ages, 11 J. CHURCH &
ST. 111, 116 (1969)
4 Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal
Christian Influences, and Medieval Authorization Impacts on the Evolution of Legal
Equitable Remedies, 26 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 483, 515 (1997).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 516.
7 Id. at 517.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 519.
2
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ecclesiastical judges could participate in the adjudicatory procedures
of state courts, and bring actions of an ecclesiastical nature before the
secular courts to be decided according to temporal laws.10 After the
division of power, however, they could do neither of these things.
By necessity, the dispensation of justice would thereafter be
determined by two types of courts – ecclesiastical and secular (lay)
jurisdictions.11 Not surprisingly, church courts did not implement
English customary law in administering justice within their own
tribunals; rather, these new ecclesiastical courts applied the medieval
canon law of the Catholic Church.12 Because these canon precedents
were strongly based on Roman Law, they were by this time a wellestablished body of developed law, especially in the areas of crime
and criminal procedure.13 For this reason, church courts claimed the
authority to preside over a wide range of legal issues.
To illustrate, the English church courts dealt not only with
crimes and public offenses against morality, but also with secular
matters.14 Ecclesiastical courts claimed broad authority to regulate
virtually every aspect of daily life of lay society, both among the
clergy and the laity.15 They believed they were endowed not only
with the legal right but also the moral duty to subvert all religious or
moral ideas that deviated from traditional orthodox Christian
norms.16 Unorthodox views, they believed, threatened not only the
salvation of the individual, but also threatened to infect society in
general.17 As one commentator summarily stated, “[i]t would have
Id. at 517.
Id.
12 Id. At the time of Henry I (1100-1135), England had a strong administrative
mechanism for resolving disputes, but the mechanism relied more on AngloSaxon law as it had evolved from local custom than from any real common
law system. POUND, supra note 2, at 41. The body of law known as the
common law would not begin to evolve in England until the reign of Henry
II (c. 1154). Id.
13 R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 613, 617 (1983).
14 Id.
15 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 219
(Rochester, New York: Lawyer’s Co-operative, 1929); JAMES A. BRUNDAGE,
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 70 (New York, New York: Longman Group, 1995).
16 Id.
17 Id.
10
11
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been difficult, indeed almost impossible, for an individual, regardless
of social status or occupation, to remain untouched from one year’s
end to the next by the canonical regulations.”18 It was on this basis
that church authorities claimed the right to regulate all commercial
and non-commercial activity, matters of a sexual nature, legitimacy
issues, labor concerns, testamentary succession, matters relating to the
poor and disadvantaged, and the burial of the dead.19 Throughout
this period the church courts endeavored to make their legal system
conform as much as possible to the ideal of Christian conduct, and to
lessen the gap between law and moral conduct.20
Similarly, ecclesiastical courts claimed the right to prosecute
and, if necessary, excommunicate those individuals whose views
offended the church’s values.21 The most frequently tried issues in
church courts were those of a criminal nature,22 for church authorities
had to try all crimes committed by clerics (or clerks) of whatever
description.23 Thus, anyone who enjoyed the privileges of clerical
status – monks, hermits, nuns, and the like – were subject to the
jurisdiction of the church.24 It is important to note, however, while
the church may have cast a wide net insofar as its claim of authority
to resolve legal actions among clergy and laypersons alike, its
assertions were at all times subject to the power granted the church
courts by the English crown.25 For this reason, conflicts would soon
arise between the church and crown with respect to their courts’
perceived interests and responsibilities.
First, the needs and demands of an individual claimant would
often-times determine, or at least encourage, which court the claimant
would petition for relief.26 In other words, whether a claim was
Id. at 96.
Id. at 71.
20 PLUCKNETT, supra note 15, at 218.
21 Id. Under canon law, “excommunication was the most serious sanction the
Church had to wield against those who disobeyed its laws.” Richard H.
Helmholtz, Excommunication in Twelfth Century England, 11 J. L. & RELIG. 235,
236 (1994-95).
22 Helmholz, supra note 13, at 618.
23 BRUNDAGE, supra note 15, at 71.
24 Id.
25 Jones, supra note 3, at 114.
26 Id. at 115.
18
19
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brought or heard in courts of church or crown often depended upon
the relief sought.27 For instance, canon law favored the flexible
disposition of property by testament, while English customary law
preferred conveyances in accordance with established rules.28 A byproduct of this consumer choice (or “forum shopping” as it is known
today) was that each of the courts would feverishly work to safeguard
their own jurisdictions from the encroachment by the other, while at
the same time seek to draw as many claimants to their own tribunals
as possible.29
A second factor contributing to this dissension concerned the
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding particular pleas or else the
complex legal issues presented for review in any particular case,
which, depending on the how the claim was viewed by any particular
court and what method of proof would be used in the case might
determine how the issue was decided.30 One source of tension
concerned the large number of disputes about land between bishops
and laypeople. Again, the question concerned what method of proof
would be used to determine the controversy.31 While trial by battle
was unacceptable to the church, documentary evidence or witness
testimony was unacceptable to the king.32 Generally speaking, such
disputes were generated by both laymen and clergy, who were
attempting to exploit jurisdictional rivalries for personal wealth or
advantage.33 Individual claimants were pleading their case to
whatever court could resolve them, regardless of the pretensions of
either jurisdiction.34
A third complicating factor was that the crown courts came to
resent the sweeping jurisdictional claims of the ecclesiastical courts
and, more importantly, claimed the authority to define the boundaries
of the church’s jurisdiction – a claim that church authorities strongly

Id.
BRUNDAGE, supra note 15, at 97.
29 Id.
30 Jones, supra note 3, at 115.
31 Charles Donahue, Jr., Biology and the Origins of the English Jury, 17 LAW &
HIST. REV. 591, 593 (1999).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
27
28
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contested.35 Superior power rested with the crown, which, if
necessary, could halt any procedures of the Christian courts which
infringed or threatened to infringe upon the authority of the crown,
and could similarly punish those ecclesiastical judges who disobeyed
the crown’s commands.36 It is not difficult to understand that the two
legal systems could not co-exist once their shared goals continued to
erode and the distrust between the crown and church became more
and more apparent.37 The controversy between King Henry II and
Archbishop Thomas Becket brings to bear the intensity of this conflict.
III. THE BECKET AFFAIR
In 1154, Henry II’s reign as King of England began. Henry,
like many rulers before him, believed the Catholic Church in general
and the Pope in particular had too much authority in England.38
“Accordingly, Henry sought to assert his own position of power by
decreasing the power of the English bishops in whom the Pope’s
authority was vested.”39 In furtherance of this goal, he appointed his
friend and colleague, Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury.40
However, Becket’s views were not completely aligned with those of
Henry.41 Becket advocated “clerical immunity” – a system in which
the church, relying upon the canon law principle that clerks had to be
tried in church courts, permitted its holy order to escape the authority
of the royal courts in cases of alleged wrongdoing.42 The right of the
church courts, Becket believed, was central to the authority of the
Church, and he insisted on enforcing its prerogatives.43
“Henry, however, believed ‘criminous’ clerks, like other
criminals, should be brought before the King’s court.”44 Henry’s
Richard H. Helmholtz, Conflicts Between Religious and Secular Law: Common
Themes in the English Experience, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 709 (1991).
36 Jones, supra note 3, at 114.
37 Moser, supra note 4, at 517.
38 Peter D. Jason, The Courts Christian in Medieval England, 37 CATHOLIC LAW.
339, 342 (1997).
39 Id. at 342-43.
40 Id. at 343.
41 Id.
42 Moser, supra note 4, at 521.
43 Id.
44 Jason, supra note 38, at 344.
35

A PRIMER ON THE THOMAS BECKET AFFAIR

151

principle concern was that the doctrine of clerical immunity was
being abused by many of his ecclesiastical subjects, in the desire to
circumvent the authority of the crown’s courts and seek relief under
the more hospitable ecclesiastical courts.45 To be sure, many royal
subjects assumed the role of “clerks” as a means of saving themselves
from prosecution under the crown.46
In response, Henry published the Constitutions of Clarendon
in 1164, which was designed to expand the power of the crown at the
expense of church courts and to end what he believed to be
jurisdictional overreaching by church authorities.47 Henry published
sixteen Constitutions in all.48 Not surprisingly, Henry’s actions
brought an immediate response from the Pope, who promptly
denounced “ten of the Constitutions, four of which concerned the
jurisdiction of church courts.”49 More important for our purposes,
however, was the controversy that erupted between Becket and
Henry II with respect to the Constitutions.
Becket was concerned that the jurisdictional reforms set up by
Henry provided the possibility of double punishment (now known as
the concept of “double jeopardy”), as Henry’s plan permitted the
prosecution of crimes in both the ecclesiastical and King’s courts.50
Becket, however, believed that when a person may be tried by either
court and has been tried by one, it was intolerable that he should be
tried again for the same crime.51 Becket insisted there should be but
one trial, and naturally, that any such trial should be before the
ecclesiastical courts since clerics were exempt from secular criminal
process by virtue of their religious standing.52 Becket perceived
Henry’s authority as an unlawful concentration of power in the crown
Moser, supra note 4, at 520.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Jason, supra note 38, at 343.
49 Id.
50 Id. at n. 35. More specifically, Henry’s Clarendon declaration pronounced,
among other things, that “while jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was
retained over felonies less than treason committed by ecclesiastical
personnel, the punishment itself could be carried out only by the royal
courts.” Moser, supra note 4, at 521.
51 POUND, supra note 2, at 41.
52 Id.
45
46
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and as an assault upon the liberty of the Church – a stance that would
make him a martyr for his cause.53
Conversely, Henry insisted upon the supremacy of the crown,
at least in matters of lay relations.54 This matter of jurisdiction was
the core of the conflict between these two old friends.55 And it was for
this right that Becket struggled to preserve the liberty and authority of
the church, and it was for this cause that he would ultimately lose his
life also, surprisingly enough, at the hands (at least indirectly) of his
old friend.56 At the height of their controversy, Becket was murdered
by four loyal subjects of Henry II who, perhaps mistakenly, perceived
Henry’s ill-fated remark “Who will free me from this turbulent
priest?” as a directive from Henry to kill Becket.57 Under the auspices
of this royal “mandate,” four of Henry’s knights took it upon
themselves to assassinate Becket on the floor of the Canterbury
Cathedral in 1170.58
The public outrage surrounding Becket’s assassination forced
Henry II to repent and submit to the authority of the Pope for his role
in Becket’s death.59 But more than anything else, he did this for the
sake of restoring unity in England.60 After Becket’s death, Henry was
forced to limit the state’s power over ecclesiastical courts – limits that
survive today throughout the West.61 Indeed, the principle of
separation of church and state entered the formal canon law soon
after Becket’s death, declaring void any statute that contravened
ecclesiastical liberty.62 These limits were instrumental in creating a
Edward McGlynn Gaffnery, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More,
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1997).
54 Id.
55 Jason, supra note 38, at 343.
56 R.H. Helmholtz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297,
313 (1999).
57 Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 729, 738 (1990).
58 Marvin Zalman, et al., Michigan’s Assisted Suicide Three Ring Circus – An
Intersection of Law and Politics, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 863, 901 n. 178 (1997).
59 Jason, supra note 38, at 343.
60 Abbe Smith & William Montrose, The Calling of Criminal Matters, 50
MERCER L. REV. 443, 515 n. 491 (1991).
61 Jason, supra note 38, at 344.
62 Helmholtz, supra note 56, at 313.
53
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balance between the state and the individual by curtailing the
absolute power of the state to regulate all matters.
Upon reflection, Henry’s actions can be explained as a
campaign to displace the power of the Church in the temporal and
spiritual affairs of England and to establish one rule of law in all of
England.63 Becket, on the other hand, “attempted to establish that
human law was in the shadow of divine law, appealing to a law
greater than the law articulated by Henry II.”64 Despite the
unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Becket affair, it is fair to
say that the struggle contributed greatly to the development of a body
of law that remains with us to this day.
Through his efforts to limit the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and
his powerful royal in the administration of justice, Henry II developed
a body of law suited for the needs of England at the time, and it is
through the rise of the system of courts laid down in the century to
follow Henry II that served as the foundation of the common law. 65
Similarly, it was Thomas Becket’s adherence to the equitable
principles of canon law that was primarily responsible for bringing
about the adoption of the concept of double jeopardy in the common
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the jurisdictional struggle between the courts
in twelfth century England generally, and the rivalry between Henry
II and Becket specifically, reflected the political controversy and
power struggles of the era. The secularization of equity was an
arduous and deadly process. On a larger scale, however, the Becket
affair provides the bedrock upon which our common law and modern
notions of legal equity rest. And while contemporary courts may
have obviated the need for ecclesiastical courts inasmuch as modern
judges now resort to the use of equitable remedies as a means of
achieving a just and fair result in our courts, the origins of such
equitable relief properly lye in medieval England.

Moser, supra note 4, at 522.
Smith & Montrose, supra note 60, at 515 n. 491.
65 POUND, supra note 2, at 42.
63
64
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WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:
NO TRUE PRIVILEGE FOR
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
Rebecca Lee *
“To bereave a man of life . . . or by violence to
confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must
at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the
whole nation; but confinement of the person, by
secretly hurrying him to jail, where is his sufferings are
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking,
and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary
government.”1
The writ of habeas corpus2 affords people, seized by the
government, the opportunity to seek review of the validity of their



J.D. 2013, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law; Assistant
Public Defender, 4th Judicial District of Tennessee.
1 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
84 (Alexander Hamilton)).
2 Translated from Latin as “you have the body.”
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detention before the court.3 The writ protects individual liberties by
ensuring against the arbitrary use of government power to detain
individuals, by allowing prisoners to question their detention before a
judge and by creating a check and balance on the branches of
government.4 The writ, incorporated as a fundamental principle
under the United States Constitution, provides that the privilege may
only be suspended “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [as] the public
Safety may require it.”5 In fact, in 1868, Chief Justice Salton Chase
identified the right to habeas corpus as the “the most important
human right in the Constitution,” and the “best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.”6 The scope of this article will be
limited to the use of the writ and its suspension in cases of national
security.
Part I of this article will address the historical underpinnings
of the writ of habeas corpus, including the writ’s incorporation into
the United States Constitution from its British origin. Part II of this
article will discuss America’s development of the writ during the
Civil War and post-Civil War eras, which resulted in the Ku Klux
Klan Act. Part III reviews the modern usage of the writ of habeas
corpus, including the suspension of the writ following the attack on
Pearl Harbor. Part IV of this article focuses on how the protections of
habeas corpus have further been diluted by the “War on Terror”7 and
by the recent rulings affecting prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Finally,
Part V analyzes the District of Columbia courts’ decisions under the
standard established by the United States Supreme Court ruling in
Boumediene v. Bush.8

Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the
Lincoln and Bush Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2009).
4 Id. at 440.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
6 Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147,
147 (2000) (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).).
7 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President upon Arrival to the
South Lawn of the Whitehouse (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001
/09/20010916-2.html. President George W. Bush coined this phrase
following the attack on Sept. 11, 2001 when he was urging patience: “This
crusade - this war on terrorism - is going to take a while.”
8 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 744.
3
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PART I. HABEAS CORPUS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Originating in medieval England, the writ of habeas corpus
did not independently provide a court with jurisdiction over an
individual.9 Instead, the writ provided a procedural mechanism, by
which the courts employed, to produce a person in front of the court
who was needed to sufficiently adjudicate a dispute where the court
already had jurisdiction over the matter.10 Thus, a court, acting sua
sponte, could utilize the writ to exercise its judicial functions.11 One
form of the writ evolved into a mechanism which allowed a prisoner
to obtain a court order requiring officers to bring him in court for the
purpose of ascertaining the cause for his detention.12
This form of habeas eventually developed into the habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum,13 commonly referred to as the “Great
Writ,”14 and its primary use enabled the courts to limit the power of
the Crown.15 During the reign of Charles I, King Charles imprisoned
individuals without explaining the reason for their detention.16 The
writ established a procedural mechanism for a prisoner to petition a
court to claim unlawful detention.17 Upon a prima facie case of
unlawful detention, the court would issue the writ which required
prison officials to produce the prisoner to determine if legal cause for
detention existed.18 Sir Edward Coke, among others, argued that the
Magna Carta insisted that the writ of habeas corpus allowed the court
to enforce the legal limitations on royal commands, claiming that a

LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 2 (2d ed. 2010).
Id. at 2-3 (noting that the writ was historically used “to produce a person to
be prosecuted, to give evidence, or to be tried in a court of proper
jurisdiction[;] . . . to produce a person charged with the process of
execution[;] . . . to move a cause involving a person to Westminister[; and] . .
. to produce the body of a person in court”).
11 Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to Habeas Corpus in
International Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (2009).
12 Id.
13 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 3.
14 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habeas Corpus § 2.
15 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 4.
16 Id. at 4-7.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Id.
9

10
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free man should not be imprisoned without good cause.19 Thereafter,
in 1641, Parliament enacted the Star Chamber Act which explicitly
authorized courts to demand adequate reasons for a prisoner’s
detention even when the King had ordered imprisonment.20 This Act
allowed a prisoner to petition the court, and if the court did not issue
the writ, the prisoner was not precluded from filing another petition
in an alternate court.21
However, abusive tactics continued, and prisoners were often
transferred from jail to jail to avoid service on the correct jailer or sent
overseas to evade the protection of the writ.22 In response, Parliament
enacted the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679, which codified the petition
process and prohibited unauthorized movement of prisoners.23
Under the Act, Parliament retained the power to suspend the writ for
certain types of cases, for limited geographical areas, and for defined
periods of time.24 Although the Act only applied to situations where
individuals were imprisoned by governmental officials, the common
law writ continued to serve as a method to challenge judicially
imposed custody.25 The court’s application of the common law writ
remains uncertain; some authorities suggest that courts would, at
times, investigate the basis for the detention while other accounts
indicate that courts restricted its analysis to whether the court
ordering the detention had proper jurisdiction over the matter.26
However, history suggests that a court “declaring that a prisoner was
detained under legal process issued by a court of proper jurisdiction
was dispositive,” and the court refrained from review on the merits.27
As England expanded its territory through colonization, the
recognition of the writ of habeas corpus spread with the geographic
Id. at 6; but see Ryan Firestone, The Boumediene Illusion: The Unsettled Role of
Habeas Corpus Abroad in the War on Terror, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 555, 563 (2012)
(stating that some academics suggest that the Magna Carta did not provide a
basis for the writ).
20 Firestone, supra note 19, at 563.
21 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 9.
22 Farrell, supra note 11, at 555-56.
23 Id. at 556.
24 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 11.
25 Id. at 9-10.
26 Id. at 10.
27 Id.
19
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borders of the country.28 In all thirteen American colonies, the courts
recognized the common law writ of habeas corpus prior to the
American Revolution.29 Furthermore, five states felt that protection
under habeas corpus was so important that they incorporated its
protections in their constitutions.30 The Massachusetts’ constitutional
provision served as a model for the first draft of the United States
Constitution, guaranteeing:
The privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus
shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth in the most
free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner; and
shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a
limited time not exceeding twelve months.31
Although a provision recognizing habeas corpus became part
of the final draft of the United States Constitution, its language, as
ratified, and its placement within Article I have caused academic and
judicial debate because the Framers did not place the provision under
the powers of the Judiciary.32 Within Article I of the United States
Constitution, which grants powers to Congress, the Suspension
Clause dictates that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
[as] the public Safety may require it.”33 Thus, the clause grants a
negative power to Congress, allowing it to suspend the use of the writ
in certain situations rather than expressly providing for habeas corpus
as a constitutional right.34

Farrell, supra note 11, at 557.
Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96
VA. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2010).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1370 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII).
32 See Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600,
607-08 (2009).
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
34 Id.; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A
straightforward reading of this text discloses that it does not guarantee any
28
29
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By enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress expressly
granted inferior federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus.35 Since this time, Congress has only exercised its Article I,
Section 9 power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus on four
occasions.36
Although Congress has the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, the writ provides a detainee the ability to collaterally
attack the lawfulness of his attainment, and it establishes an
important balance between the branches of government.37 “It ensures
that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will
have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of
governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”38 Although
the writ clearly provides a check on the power of the president and
the executive branch, more recent Supreme Court decisions have also
invalidated congressional legislation, amounting to unconstitutional
suspension of the writ because the legislation fails to act as a formal
suspension.39

content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely
provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be
suspended.”).
35 Id. at 592 (referencing the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73); see Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall,
who declared that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to consider a
petition for habeas corpus absent a directive from Congress, as provided in
the Judiciary Act of 1789).
36 Aaron L. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on Terror: An American
Drama, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (2010) (explaining Congress has
authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas on four occurrences: (1) as a
response to President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ during the
Civil war; (2) through passing the Klu Klux Klan Act at the request of
President Grant; (3) during the 1902 rebellion in the Philippines; and (4) in
1941 after the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor).
37 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-43.
38 Id. at 745 (quoting Hamdi, infra note 93, at 536).
39 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
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PART II. LINCOLN & THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Although the Constitution delegates Congress the right to
suspend the writ, President Abraham Lincoln unilaterally authorized
his army general to suspend the writ, if necessary, in April of 1861; his
decision was prompted by the imminent fear that Confederate
soldiers would capture Washington, D.C.40 Under presidential
orders, military officials arrested and detained individuals on mere
suspicion without providing reason for their detention.41 Since
Congress was not in session at the time, Lincoln asserted that the
arrest and detention of Confederate soldiers were necessary to protect
and preserve the Nation.42 Criticism erupted and Lincoln responded
at a special session of Congress convened by Lincoln, stating:
It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and
that the public safety does require the qualified
suspension of the privilege of the writ which was
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that
Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this
power. But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which,
or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot
be believed the framers of the instrument intended,
that in every case, the danger should run its course,
until Congress could be called together; the very
assembling of which might be prevented, as was
intended in this case, by the rebellion.43
Although Congress did not specifically concede that the Executive
Branch had the power to suspend the writ under the United States
Constitution, Congress ratified the President’s actions after two years
of debate by enacting the Habeas Corpus Act in 1863, which allowed

E.g., Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444.
Tyler, supra note 32, at 638.
42 See Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444-45.
43 Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties-Then and Now: Old
Wine in New Bottles, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 533, 540 (2010).
40
41
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the President to suspend habeas corpus for a limited amount of time
when public safety required.44
Shortly after the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act, the
Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Milligan,45 described the functioning of the
Suspension Clause. The Court explained that the privilege of the writ
existed separately from the writ itself, noting that “[t]he suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ
itself. Instead, the writ issues as a matter of course, and on the return
made to it, the court decides whether the party applying is denied the
right of proceeding any further with it.”46 Thus, a court was still able
to issue the writ, and, upon review, the court had the ability to
ascertain whether individual petitioning the writ was part of the class
of the individuals for which the writ was suspended.47
KU KLUX KLAN
For the second time in the nation’s history, Congress
authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus shortly
after the conclusion of the Civil War as the Ku Klux Klan engaged in
domestic terrorist activities.48 The Ku Klux Klan committed violent
murders, attacks, and rapes, reaching epic proportions, yet resulting
in few prosecutions from local authorities.49 In fact, the Klan’s
prevalence within communities threatened the very existence of local
government, controlling law enforcement and terrorizing any
individual willing to testify in court against its members.50 In the
wake of this emergency, Congress supported President Grant’s
insistence to institute military law, allowing the detention of
suspected Ku Klux Klan members in an effort to destroy the secrecy
among its members and prevent witness intimidation by enacting the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.51 Furthermore, the Act allowed the
President to suspend the writ for the purposes of defeating the

Hafetz, supra note 3, at 445.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
46 Id. at 130-32.
47 See id.
48 Tyler, supra note 32, at 656.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 656-57.
44
45
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rebellion and to preserve public safety through preventative
detention.52
The Act, however, expressly limited the power of the
Executive Branch.53 Prior to suspending the writ in any given area,
the President was required to order the insurgents to disperse.54 In
addition, the President only had the authority to suspend the writ
until Congress’s next legislation session.55 The Act also required the
release of a prisoner if he or she was not indicted by the next seated
grand jury.56 This legislation, however, spurred extensive debate.57
Opponents of suspension asserted that Congress vested the
President with broad discretion to impact individual liberties.58 In
contrast, supporters suggested that suspension of the writ was
essential to restoring order in the affected communities, thereby
ensuring its citizens political and civil rights.59 A consensus emerged,
with both sides purporting that the suspension of the writ was an
extraordinary measure.60
Retrospectively, however, Congress,
concluded that this preventive suspension of the writ was necessary,
finding “[t]he results of suspending the writ of habeas corpus . . .
show that where the membership, mysteries, and power of the
organization have been kept concealed this is the most and perhaps
only effective remedy for its suppression.”61
A Mississippi newspaper reporter, William McCardle, filed an
appeal to the Supreme Court after being arrested for the content of his
articles and tried before a military tribunal.62 Following oral
arguments, Congress repealed section 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, which effectively stripped the Supreme Court from jurisdiction
to review the final judgments of habeas corpus petitions heard in
Id.
Id. at 657.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 658.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 658-59.
60 Id. at 659.
61 Id. at 661-62 (quoting S. Rep. No. 42-41, pt. 1, at 99 (1872)).
62 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508 (1868).
52
53
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lower courts based upon Congress’s power under the Constitution’s
Exceptions Clause.63
The Supreme Court acknowledged that
Congress had acted within the scope of its power and dismissed the
case for want of jurisdiction.64
In contrast, in Ex Parte Yerger,65 the Supreme Court held that it
had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus to an individual
asserting his unlawful imprisonment.66
The Court effectively
distinguished this case from Ex Parte Milligan by ruling that the repeal
applied only to writs brought before the Court under the Habeas
Corpus Act.67 Yet, unlike Milligan, Yerger had petitioned the Court
for a common law writ of habeas corpus.68 Thus, it seems that the
Supreme Court recognized that Congress could strip its jurisdiction
for specific categories of cases; however, Congress’s use of the
Exceptions Clause did not result in a broad interpretation of
Congress’s actions, but would be limited in scope. 69

PART III. USAGES OF THE WRIT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
WORLD WAR II
As global advances were made in modern warfare, the
Hawaiian Government recognized a real and imminent threat of war
in the Pacific.70 In response Hawaii’s legislature enacted the Hawaii
Defense Act71 on October 3, 1941, which delegated broad powers to
Id.
Id. at 510-11.
65 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
66 Id. at 88.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 511-12 (“The act conferring the
jurisdiction having been repealed, the jurisdiction ceased; and the court had
thereafter no authority to pronounce any opinion or render any judgment in
this cause. No court can do any act in any case, without jurisdiction of the
subject-matter. It can make no difference at what point, in the progress of a
cause, the jurisdiction ceases. After it has ceased, no judicial act can be
performed.”).
70 J. Garner Anthony, Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court, 57 YALE L.J.
27, 28 (1947).
71 1941 Haw. Sess. Laws 1-25.
63
64
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the executive branch in case of emergency, granting the governor
power over citizens and property, while only providing minimal
safeguards to individual rights.72 After the devastating attack on
Pearl Harbor on occurring December 7, 1941, Governor Joseph
Poindexter responded by invoking the power granted under the
Hawaii Defense Act, proclaiming martial law, establishing himself as
the military governor of Hawaii, publishing ordinances aimed at
governing the conduct of the Territory’s citizens, and creating
military tribunals to punish ordinance offenders.73 Moreover, the
governor suspended the privilege writ of habeas corpus by relying on
the Hawaiian Organic Act74 which dictated:
The governor shall be responsible for the faithful
execution of the laws of the United States and the
Territory of Hawaii . . . and he may, in case of rebellion
or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the
public safety requires it, suspend the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Territory, or any part thereof,
under martial law until communication can be had
with the president and his decision thereon made
known.75
The governor complied with the Hawaiian Organic Act by notifying
President Roosevelt that he had suspended the privilege of the writ,
but failed to communicate the extent of the power he had assumed.76
Without the benefit of this critical detail, the President supported the
Hawaiian governor’s actions.77 Therefore, based upon the President’s
uninformed approval, the Hawaiian military overtook courtrooms
and issued orders without regard to territorial, federal, or
constitutional protections, including censorship of the press.78 The
military rule created extreme oppression over the rights of the
Hawaiian citizens as later noted by the Supreme Court:

Antony, supra note 70, at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
74 48 U.S.C. § 532 (1940).
75 Antony, supra note 70, at 29.
76 Id. at 30.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 31.
72
73
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[T]he military authorities took over the government of
Hawaii. They could and did, by simply promulgating
orders, govern the day to day activities of civilians who
lived, worked, or were merely passing through there.
The military tribunals interpreted the very orders
promulgated by the military authorities and proceeded
to punish violators.79

PART IV: USAGES OF THE WRIT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
“THE WAR ON TERROR”
The devastating events of September 11, 2001, ignited fear and
insecurity in the hearts of Americans. During President George W.
Bush’s address to the nation following the attacks he stated, “All of
this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different
world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”80 A new sense
of nationalism immediately emerged as citizens united to honor the
victims.81 In addition, this event provoked the United States to
develop new security initiatives for the protection of its citizens and
to enact legislation aimed at prosecuting individuals involved in
terrorist activity and preventing further attacks on American soil,
including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(“USA PATRIOT Act”)82 and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (“AUMF”), which allowed the President to “use all necessary
and appropriate force” against those aiding terrorists.83 The United
States military led invasions, killing and detaining individuals
allegedly involved with the al Qaeda organization.84 As a result,

Id. (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946)).
President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20,
2011), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/ 09/20010920-8.html.
81 COLLEEN E. HARDY, THE DETENTION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS
DURING THE WAR ON TERROR, 5 (2009).
82 Id. at 2-3.
83 Tor Ekeland, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article i, Section 9, Clause 2, of the
United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475,
1503 (2005) (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
84 Id.
79
80
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numerous detainees around the globe petitioned federal courts,
claiming illegal detention and illegal suspension of the writ.85
As United States military forces captured enemy combatants
abroad, the Bush Administration deliberately selected Guantanamo as
the location to imprison its detainees.86 Guantanamo is a territory
currently leased and entirely controlled by the United States;
however, it falls under the Republic of Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty.87
Therefore, the Bush Administration determined that the prisoners
held there would not be entitled to the Constitution’s protections,
including the writ of habeas corpus.88 Thus, the United States could
theoretically hold the detainees indefinitely without violating the
Constitutional mandate of formal suspension of the writ89 due to the
United States Supreme Court holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager, which
denied habeas rights to a prisoner who:
(a) [wa]s an enemy alien; (b) ha[d] never been or
resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside
of our territory and there held in military custody as a
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a
Military Commission sitting outside the United States;
(e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside
the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned
outside the United States.90
Thus, the ruling allowed government officials to manipulate a
prisoner’s location to purposefully evade the protection of the writ--the very evil that the writ was intended to guard against.91
As the “War on Terror” escalated, petitions for the writ of
habeas corpus flooded the courts, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to several “War on Terror” detainees. In these opinions, the
Court clarified the constitutional protection of the writ and
Id.
Hafetz, supra note 3, at 441.
87 HARDY, supra note 81, at 152.
88 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 441.
89 Id. at 442.
90 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950).
91 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444.
85
86
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established jurisdictional requirements when “enemy combatants”
asserted that they possessed a right to petition the court for habeas
corpus. On June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided
three such opinions: Rumsfeld v. Padilla,92 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,93 and
Rasul v. Bush.94
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, federal agents apprehended Padilla, a
United States citizen, while disembarking a plane at Chicago O’Hare
International Airport.95 Ultimately, the Department of Defense
detained Padilla at the Consolidated Navy Brig in Charleston, South
Carolina and designated Padilla as an “enemy combatant.”96 Padilla
filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
Southern District of New York97 where he had been in criminal
custody prior to his detention in South Carolina.98 Although not
reviewing the merits of Padilla’s petition, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the proper respondent for the
petition and whether the Southern District of New York had
jurisdiction over this respondent.99 The Court held that “the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being
held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory
official.”100 Since Commander Marr was the equivalent of a warden at
the naval brig, the Court determined that Marr, instead of Secretary
Rumsfeld was the proper respondent.101 Furthermore, the Court
found that “the general rule for core habeas petitions challenging
present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district--the district of confinement.”102 Thus, the South Carolina District
Court was the only court with jurisdiction over the petition.103 The

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
94 Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
95 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430.
96 Id. at 431-32.
97 Id. at 432.
98 Id. at 430-31.
99 Id. at 434.
100 Id. at 435.
101 Id. at 436.
102 Id. at 443.
103 Id. at 451.
92
93
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Court remanded the case with an order of dismissal without
prejudice.104
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Northern Alliance seized a United
States citizen living in Afghanistan and turned him over to the United
States military.105 Interrogated and detained in Afghanistan, Hamdi
was later transferred to Guantanamo and, eventually, to the naval
brig located Charleston, South Carolina.106 The Government labeled
Hamdi as an “enemy combatant” and claimed that this status alone
justified indefinite detention without formal charges or
proceedings.107 Although the Court noted that formal suspension of
the writ had not occurred,108 it recognized that Congress had enacted
the AUMF after 9/11, which “authorize[d] the President to use ‘all
necessary and appropriate force’ against ‘nations, organizations, or
persons’ associated with the . . . terrorist attacks.”109 In holding that
Hamdi must be notified of the factual basis for his classification as an
“enemy combatant”110 and allowed to dispute his status before a
neutral decision-maker in a timely and meaningful manner, the Court
stated that the proceeding “may be tailored to alleviate [its]
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict.”111 The Court suggested that the hearing could
include the introduction of hearsay and a burden-shifting scheme that
would allow the Government a rebuttable presumption as to the
credibility of its evidence, requiring the petitioner to rebut the
presumption with more “persuasive evidence.”112 Moreover, the
Court stated that those deemed to be “enemy combatants” could be
detained throughout the duration of the hostilities with the Taliban,
which could potentially result in indefinite confinement.113 Therefore,
the Court ruled that the government’s standard of “some evidence”
Id.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 525.
109 Id. at 518.
110 The Court defined “enemy combatant” as individual who was “‘part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ . . . and
[who] ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’” Id. at 516.
111 Id. at 533.
112 Id. at 533-34.
113 Id. at 520.
104
105
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was inadequate under the Constitution’s due process standard.114 The
Court noted that its holding did not preclude the government from
utilizing a military tribunal employing a constitutional process.115
In Rasul v. Bush, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the protections of habeas corpus should be extended for two
Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who were captured
abroad during military actions against al Qaeda and the Taliban.116
Filing in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
the petitioners challenged their detention, claiming that they were not
“enemy combatants” or terrorists and alleging that they were not
allowed access to a court or tribunal.117 The district court dismissed
all actions for lack of jurisdiction by relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager
and found that the privilege of the writ did not extend to a territory in
which the United States lacked sovereignty.118 The Court recognized
that the rule in Eisentrager only applied to detainees’ constitutional
right to habeas corpus review.119 Thereafter, the Court analyzed
whether the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which authorized federal
district courts to hear petitions of the writ for any person “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States,” and “within their respective jurisdictions,”120 provided
judicial review to the Guantanamo detainees where the United States
did not have ultimate sovereignty.121 After reviewing the lease with
Cuba which stated that the United States has “complete jurisdiction
and control” over Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, the Court determined
that the statute would provide the district court with jurisdiction over
claims of a United States citizen and, since the statute did not state
that aliens and citizens would be treated differently, ruled that aliens
were entitled to protection of the writ under the statute.122 Thus, the

Id. at 538.
Id.
116 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71.
117 Id. at 471-72.
118 Id. at 472.
119 Id. at 476.
120 Id. at 473.
121 Id. at 475.
122 Id. at 480-81.
114
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Court remanded the case to the district court for a decision on its
merits.123
In 2006, the Supreme Court, granted certiorari to Hamdan, an
alien detainee, imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay.124 Shortly after 9/11,
a presidential order was issued, governing “Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”
when the “President determines ‘there is reason to believe’ that he or
she (1) ‘is or was’ a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or
participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the United
States.”125 The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
based upon the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, (“DTA”), which
removed jurisdiction from any court to consider “an application for a
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”126 Instead, the
Act vested the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) exclusive
jurisdiction to establish the classification of the detainees located in
Guantanamo and vested the District of Columbia exclusive
jurisdiction for final review, albeit with a limited scope, of the CSRT’s
determination.127 The Court denied the Government’s motion,
finding that the jurisdiction stripping statute did not affect pending
cases.128
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court addressed whether
Hamdan’s charge of a conspiracy could be tried by a military
commission under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”)
and the Geneva Conventions.129
The Court recognized that,
historically, military commissions have been convened as “an
‘incident to the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt
Id. at 485.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
125 Id. at 568.
126 Id. at 572-731.
127 Id. at 570, 573.
128 Id. at 577.
129 Id. at 567.
123
124
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to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
war.’”130 However, the Court determined that the offense of
conspiracy did not constitute an offense against the law of war
because neither the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would not be
considered a war crime nor did they occur during a time of war.131
Furthermore, the procedures employed by the military commission
did not pass constitutional muster and violated both the UCMJ and
the Geneva Conventions.132 “Another striking feature of the rules
governing Hamdan's commission is that they permit the admission of
any evidence that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, ‘would have
probative value to a reasonable person,’” including hearsay and
evidence obtained through coercion.133 In addition, any appeal panel
was required to “disregard any variance” from governing
procedures.134 The Court concluded that the tribunal must provide
the protections guaranteed by courts-martial.135 In direct response to
this holding, Congress responded by enacting the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq. (Supp. 2007),
which denied federal courts jurisdiction of habeas corpus actions
pending at the time of enactment.136
In Boumediene, a petition for habeas corpus was granted
certiorari, and the Court recognized that the statute had stripped the
Court of jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court addressed
whether the constitutional privilege of the writ extended to enemy
combatant detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.137 The Court analyzed
the historical basis for the writ of habeas corpus, noting that during
Id. at 596 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942)).
Id. at 612.
132 Id. at 567.
133 Id. at 614 (quoting Department of Defense, Military Commission Order
No. 1, P 6(D)(1) (March 21, 2004)), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord. pdf) (2002
version with the same wording).
134 Id. at 615 (quoting Military Commission Order No. 1, P 6(H)(4)).
135 Id. at 634.
136 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735-36.
137 Id. at 736.
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federal Constitution ratifying conventions, the Suspension Clause was
“an ‘exception’ to the ‘power given to Congress to regulate courts,’”
and the “Clause not only protects against suspensions of the writ but
also guarantees an affirmative right to judicial inquiry into the causes
of detention.”138 In addition, the Court rejected the argument that the
protection of the writ only applied in territories where the United
States maintained de facto sovereignty and held that the Suspension
Clause had full effect in Guantanamo Bay.139 Thus, the Court held
that the Constitutional privilege of the writ applied to the
Guantanamo detainees, which could not be withdrawn without a
formal suspension.140
Thus, the Court analyzed whether Congress could avoid
formally suspending the writ by statutorily creating a mechanism that
provided an adequate substitute for the writ’s protection.141 By enacting
the DTA, Congress provided a review of the CSRT’s proceedings
limited to assessing whether the CSRT complied with its own
procedures.142 However, the Court found that a substitute habeas
proceeding:
must have the means to correct errors that occurred
during the CSRT proceedings . . . includ[ing] some
authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s
evidence against the detainee. It also must have the
authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory

Id. at 743-44 (quoting 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 460-464 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876)).
139 Id. at 770-71 (distinguishing the facts from Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950),
and recognizing the United States de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo
Bay).
140 Id. at 732.
141 Id. at 733 (“After Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether
individuals detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants,’ as the
Department defines that term.”).
142 Id. at 777.
138
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evidence that was not introduced during the earlier
proceeding.143

Furthermore, a habeas substitute court must be able to order
conditional release.144 Although the Court recognized that the
legitimacy of the military objective in detaining threats to our nation
in order to avoid the dispersion of classified information, the Court
held that the DTA impermissibly diluted the protection of the writ.145
This opinion ensures that the historical protection of the writ
of habeas corpus applies to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
However, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to any habeas
corpus petitions since the Boumediene decision. Moreover, a study
from the Seton Hall Law School suggests that the writ has not been
given the Constitutional protections as allocated by the Supreme
Court’s holdings.146 In fact, the report notes that since Boudmediene’s
decision, forty-six habeas petitions have been filed, but after the
District of Columbia Circuit Court decided Al-Adahi v. Obama147 in
2010, detainees have lost 92% of petitions as a result of judicial
deference to the Government’s allegations.148
In Al-Adahi, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted Al-Adahi’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
because the court found “‘no reliable evidence in the record that [AlAdahi] was a member of al-Qaida’ and ruled that he should be
released.”149 The Government appealed, and the District of Columbia
Circuit Court first acknowledged that both parties agreed that the
Id. at 786.
Id. at 779 (suggesting that “release need not be the exclusive remedy and
is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted”).
145 Id. at 796.
146 Mark Denbeaux, et al., Seton Hall Law Ctr. for Policy and Research, No
Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful Review 11 (May 1, 2012),
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/
policyresearch/upload/hearing-habeas.pdf
147 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011).
148 Denbeaux, supra note 146, at 1.
149 613 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280(GK), 2009 WL
2584685 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009)).
143
144
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preponderance of the evidence standard should be applied.150
However, the court admonished the district court in failing to apply
the “conditional probability analysis,” finding:
Those who do not take into account conditional
probability are prone to making mistakes in judging
evidence. They may think that if a particular fact does
not itself prove the ultimate proposition (e.g., whether
the detainee was part of al-Qaida), the fact may be
tossed aside and the next fact may be evaluated as if
the first did not exist. This is precisely how the district
court proceeded in this case: Al Adahi’s ties to bin
Laden “cannot prove” he was part of Al Qaida and this
evidence therefore “must not distract the Court.” The
fact that Al Adahi stayed in an al-Qaida guesthouse “is
not in itself sufficient to justify detention. Al Adahi’s
attendance at an al-Qaida training camp “is not
sufficient to carry the Government’s burden of
showing that he was part” of al-Qaida. And so on.
The government is right: the district court wrongly
“required each piece of the government’s evidence to
bear weigh without regard to all (or indeed any) other
evidence in the case. This was a fundamental mistake
that infected the court’s entire analysis.151
The court proceeded to discuss evidence in the record, which
independently may be insufficient to categorize Al-Adahi as an
enemy combatant, but when analyzed as a whole met the

150The

court, however, was unconvinced that the Constitution requires a
preponderance of the evidence stand, but suggested that the government
may only be required to produce “some evidence.” Id. at 1104.
151 Id. at 1105-06 (internal citations omitted).
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preponderance of the evidence standard.152 Therefore, the court
remanded the case with instructions to deny Al-Adahi’s petition.153
Since the Al-Adahi decision, only one petition has been
granted, Latif v. Obama,154 but it was subsequently vacated and
remanded. Further, the Seton Hall Law School’s study suggests that
the individual components of evidence that the District of Columbia
Circuit Court utilized to justify its reversal in Al-Adahi: hostile acts,
detainees staying in guesthouses, detainees attendance at a training
camp, and a detainees’ travel route, have been employed by the
district court to systemically deny later habeas court petitions,
suggesting that governmental findings are afforded extreme
deference.155
In Latif, the district court granted Latif’s petition for habeas
corpus, and, once again, the government appealed.156 Although Latif
did not deny that he had been interviewed and did not claim that his
statements were involuntary, he argued that the governmental record
was unreliable because “his interrogators [Text Redacted By the
Court] so garbled his words that their summary bears no relation to
what he actually said.”157 The district court determined that there was
a serious question as to the accuracy of the government’s reports.158
However, the circuit court rejected this finding.159

Id. at 1111 (finding that the record showed that Al Adahi stayed at an alQaida guesthouse, attended an al-Qaida training camp, met with bin Laden,
wearing a model of Casio watch commonly worn linked to al-Qaida, had
inconsistent explanations for his actions, and was captured on a bus carrying
wounded Arabs and Pakistanis).
153 Id.
154 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012).
155 Denbeaux, supra note 146, at 6-11.
156 677 F.3d at 1176.
157 Id. at 1178.
158 Id.
159 Id.
152

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

177

The circuit court noted that there is a presumption of
authenticity and regularity of governmental reports.160
The
presumption of regularity “presumes the government official
accurately identified the source and accurately summarized his
statement, but it implies nothing about the truth of the underlying
non-government source’s statement.”161 The court concluded that the
district court was required to make specific findings as to Latif’s
credibility, but rather it had determined that Latif presented a
“plausible alternative story.”162 Therefore, in absence of such a
credibility finding, the court vacated the order and remanded the
case.163

PART V: CONCLUSION
Although the Court determined that the enactment of the DTA
constituted an impermissible suspension of the writ because of a lack
of formal suspension in Boumediene, the Court never stated whether
Congress could formally suspend the writ based on the “War on
Terror.”164 Under the Constitution, the writ may only be suspended
“in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [as] the public Safety may require
it.”165 Historically, Congress has only utilized its power to suspend
the writ when hostilities occurred on U.S. soil, affecting a limited
number of defined individuals or for a limited duration.
Our enemies in the “War on Terror” include individuals
affiliated with the underground terrorist organization al Qaeda. Its
membership spans across many countries, and its decentralized
Id. at 1180.
Id.
162 Id. at 1190.
163 See id. at 1192; Charlie Savage, Military Identifies Guantanamo Detainee Who
Died, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/politics/detainee-who-died-atguantanamo-had-release-blocked-by-court.html (stating that on September 8,
2012, after a decade of detention, Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif was found dead
in his cell).
164 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
160
161
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system makes it difficult to ascertain its members. In comparing this
organization to the historical enemies where the writ was suspended,
this organization most closely resembles the Klu Klux Klan because
the Klan’s membership did not encompass an entire region or nation.
However, during this period, Congress delicately balanced the
nation’s need to usurp the power of the Klan to preserve the
legitimacy of the justice system against the fundamental principle that
the executive branch should not be able to yield the power to
arbitrarily imprison individuals by expressly limiting the executive
branch’s power during the writ’s suspension. Congress seemingly
recognized that, during periods of rebellion, the executive branch
may abuse its power and undermine the constitutional protection of
the writ.
Even in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in
England during the 1600s:
[T]he writ proved to be an imperfect check. Even
when the importance of the writ was well understood
in England, habeas relief often was denied by the
courts or suspended by Parliament.
Denial or
suspension occurred in times of political unrest, to the
anguish of the imprisoned and the outrage of those in
sympathy with them.166
Furthermore, the Court understood that habeas corpus proceedings
are more crucial where detention is ordered by the executive branch
rather than a disinterested tribunal.167
In addition, under the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress restricted
the executive branch’s power by limiting the suspension’s duration.
The “War on Terror,” however, is perpetual, and contains no
identifiable means to determine its conclusion. In fact, the Boumediene
Court acknowledged that the “War on Terror” was clearly
distinguishable from prior military conflicts which were for limited
duration, and that the Court may need to address the outer limits of
166
167

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741.
Id. at 783.
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the president’s war powers “to preserve constitutional values while
protecting the Nation from terrorism.”168 Thus, it is unclear whether
Congress could currently constitutionally suspend the writ after more
than ten years after al Qaeda’s invasion based on the constitutional
requirement that the writ may only be suspended for the public
safety.
Moreover, without a formal suspension, the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay are entitled, under the Boumediene decision, to the
constitutional protections of the writ. The Court declared, “[w]ithin
the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of
judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to
hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a
person.”169 However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court has
impermissibly ignored this critical responsibility, and its decisions
threaten individuals misclassified as enemy combatants with
indefinite confinement and without effective means to challenge their
detention.
A CSRT consists of a hearing and a review of classified and
unclassified evidence by a panel of three military judges, and
evidence against the detainee is withheld from him, making it
seemingly impossible to rebut his involvement in al Qaeda or other
terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the detainees do not have access
to sources of proof due to both their imprisonment and distance from
their homeland.170 Finally, the rules of evidence and criminal
procedure have been relaxed to such an extent that the ownership of
personal property similar to property employed in al Qaeda
Id. at 797-98.
Id. at 797.
170
At the conclusion of the CRST for Al-Adahi, Al-Adahi requested
to see the classified information. The Tribunal President responded:
“Classified information cannot be revealed to a Detainee.”
Thereafter, Al-Adahi asked to look at the Unclassified Evidence. The
Tribunal President did not allow this either, and responded by
stating that “[b]asically, all of the Unclassified has been shown to
you.” Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement at 9, Al-Adahi v.
Obama, 692 F.Supp.2d 85 (2010) (No. 05-CV-0280 (GK), available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/M
ohammed_Al_Edah_Government_Allegations.pdf.
168
169
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bombings can be introduced as evidence of the detainee’s affiliation to
the organization, even without an admission of ownership by the
detainee or a chain of custody establishing ownership.
In Boumediene, the Court recognized that the “necessary scope
of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier
proceedings,” and, when detention is based upon an executive order
rather than a judicial proceeding in front of a disinterested judge, the
habeas court must have authority to conduct meaningful review, of
both cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.171
However, the court continually fails to exercise its authority. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court has unilaterally instituted a
standard of review that is insurmountable for these detainees.
Deference is afforded to the Government’s findings of fact and
documents, whereby the detainee must prove his innocence without
adequate means of doing so after only a probable cause hearing
which has determined his status as an enemy combatant, even in a
time when the needs of war do not mandate such a relaxed standard.
This diminishes the underlying purpose of the writ and its collateral
function, which provides the habeas court the power to review the
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence used to detain the
individual. The Judiciary must necessarily act as a check on the
Executive branch’s power, but blanket deference to the Government
results in no check at all – when it is the only check that can reverse an
arbitrary and indefinite detention.
The problem is further exacerbated because the CSRT and
habeas reviews cannot be fully scrutinized by our nation’s citizens.
American courts have historically existed as open forums, ensuring
the integrity of the justice system. In Globe Newspaper Company v.
Superior Court for Norfolk County,172 the United States Supreme Court
noted:
the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the judicial
process and the government as a whole. Public
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with
171
172

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781, 783-84.
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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benefits to both the defendant and to society as a
whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial
fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening
public respect for the judicial process. And in the
broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits
the public to participate in and serve as a check upon
the judicial process - - an essential component in our
structure of self-government. In sum, the institutional
value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both
logic and experience.
Although the Court has historically recognized exceptions to open
courtroom proceedings where safety and justice demands, these
closed proceedings are memorialized in court records and documents
available to the public at a later time. In the CSRTs and habeas
reviews, concerns for national safety require that they be closed to the
public. However, many of the documents available to the public for
review are redacted or deemed classified information, preventing any
real scrutiny by the public.
Therefore, as the law stands now, the Guantanamo Bay
detainees are destined to indefinite detention without any meaningful
review. Congress is arguably unable to formally suspend the writ,
which could limit the power of the Executive in detaining those
classified as enemy combatants. Furthermore, our nation’s citizens
have no meaningful method to ascertain whether the judicial system
is adhering to Constitutional mandates. Meanwhile, the District of
Columbia of Circuit Court has given the Executive Branch extreme
deference in its findings, eliminating all cognizable rights to the writ
under our Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
Many Americans believe our schools are no longer segregated,
and legally they are correct. However, although statutory segregation
was abolished with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in the landmark
case of Brown v. Board of Education,1 a different type of nongovernment mandated segregation exists in our school systems today:
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Brown v. Board of Ed. Of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(“Brown I”).
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de facto segregation. De facto segregation may be the result of a
combination of events outside the government’s control, but that does
not extinguish the fact black students and Hispanic students are
suffering under the effects of living in a segregated society. Part I of
this note will discuss the history of slavery in America and how de
jure and de facto segregation were established. Part II will analyze de
facto segregation specifically in Knoxville, Tennessee. Part III will
focus on the causes of de facto segregation. Part IV will review the
different types of remedies that have been attempted to rectify de
facto segregation and the obstacles school districts face in trying to
implement their remedial plans. Finally, Part V will conclude with a
proposal of how school districts can become integrated without using
race as a factor. Because America is a melting pot of nationalities and
races, children who are educated in schools heavily populated by a
single race are at a severe disadvantage once they graduate and enter
into the real world, especially children in minority populations.
America has come a long way from the days of slavery, but it has yet
to reach the point where children are no longer classified by their race
but rather by their character and what they can contribute to society.

PART I: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, HOW DE JURE
SEGREGATION WAS ESTABLISHED, AND THE SHIFT TO DE FACTO
SEGREGATION
The history of segregation in American school systems began
long before it was an independent nation. In order to understand de
facto segregation, one must first understand how segregation started
in America. In 1619, twenty slaves from Africa were brought to the
colony of Jamestown, Virginia.2 These twenty people were the first
slaves to be brought to America. From 1619 until the Emancipation
Proclamation of 1862 issued by President Abraham Lincoln, many
white land owners owned slaves and used them to work in their
fields and serve them in their homes.3 Slavery was not officially
abolished until the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was
adopted in 1865.4 Furthermore, it was not until the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868 that former slaves received the
Slavery in America. http://www.history.com/topics/slavery (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012).
3 Id.
4 Id.
2
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rights of citizenship and equal protection, and they were not granted
the right to vote until the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted in 1870.5
The significance of the history of slavery and when it was abolished is
that it explains why, until 1954, there were schools for white children
and schools for black children. Ideally, it would be nice to say that
white slave owners treated their slaves with respect by paying the
slaves for their work and educating the slaves and their children and
seeing to all the physical and medical needs of all the slaves on their
property. However, the exact opposite was the case.
There may be a few slave owners in history who treated their
slaves like hired workers and provided care and benefits to them in
return for their work; however, the sad truth is most white slave
owners treated the African slaves as if they were property and less
than human.6 Frederick Douglass stated in My Bondage and My
Freedom that at the time he was writing, killing a slave or any colored
person was not a crime in Maryland.7 Writing about how slaves were
denied the right to be educated, Douglass stated that when his second
owner, Master Hugh, learned that his wife was teaching Douglass
how read the bible, Hugh forbade her to continue teaching Douglass
because it was unlawful saying:
[i]f you teach [Douglass]…how to read the bible, there
will be no keeping him…it would forever unfit him for
the duties of a slave…and as to himself, learning would
do him no good, but probably, a great deal of harm—
making him disconsolate and unhappy…if you learn
him how to read, he’ll want to know how to write; and,
this accomplished, he’ll be running away with himself. 8
White people became accustomed to the idea that a
black person could not be educated. As evidence, for
over one hundred and fifty years, it had been illegal to
educate a slave due to the slave codes in many states.
Therefore, it would be decades before former slaves
saw the benefits of the abolition of slavery. An example
Id.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 43 (1855).
7 Id. at 98.
8 Id. at 114
5
6
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of a slave code which made it illegal to educate slaves
or former slaves is Georgia’s Slave Code Section 2(11)
which stated: If any slave, Negro, or free person of
color, or any white person, shall teach any other slave,
Negro, or free person of color, to read or write either
written or printed characters, the said free person of
color or slave shall be punished by fine and whipping,
or fine or whipping, and the discretion of the court.9

Once slaves were made free citizens, they were still governed
by the slave codes, regardless of whether the Supreme Court actually
made a declaration that it followed the now illegal slave code in its
holdings in cases where one or more former-slaves were involved.10
As a whole, African-Americans who were former slaves were treated
as an inferior race to white Americans. Rather than trying to create an
environment where everyone coexisted, white legislatures and city
council members developed the habit of distinguishing the difference
between white people and black people in all areas of life: separate
train cars, separate boarding docks, separate schools, separate
churches, even separate parts of the street one could walk. Thus,
although former slaves were now free people in society, the
influences of the slave codes still dictated the court systems and black
people were judged far more severely than white people who were
charged with similar crimes.11 When the slaves were granted their
freedom, it should have meant that they would be treated with
equality and justice for all, instead the pre-emancipation influences
were so strong that rather than blending the societies, de jure
segregation was formed to legally keep the societies separated.
De jure segregation is segregation permitted by law.12 In many
former slave-holding states, laws and statutes were created to restrict,
limit, or make it completely impossible for minority citizens to
exercise their rights. Laws were made to prevent minorities from
loading the train in a certain spot or walk on a certain side of the
Codification of the Statute Law of Georgia § 2(11) (Hotchkiss comp.,
Grenville 1848) (1861).
10 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., “Rather Than the Free“: Free Blacks in Colonial
and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 18 (1991).
11
Id.
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
9
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street. The first landmark case to address this concept of legal
segregation was Plessy v. Ferguson.13 In that case, Plessy filed a law
suit against a criminal district court judge John H. Ferguson in
Louisiana after Plessy was ejected from the train after refusing to
remove himself to the train car designated for black passengers.14
Plessy challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana law which
provided for separate train cars for whites and minorities.15 Plessy
argued that the separation was a violation of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.16 However, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the state law providing for
separate cars on a train to separate the races did not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment because:
[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction
between the white and colored races-a distinction
which is founded in the color of the two races, and
which must always exist so long as white men are
distinguished from the other race by color-as no
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races,
or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.17
As for the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the Court ultimately
held that forcing citizens to separate on the basis of color was
constitutional so long as the separate accommodations were equal in
what they offered to that class of people.18 In dicta, the Court
indicated that segregation is necessary because when one race is
inferior to another, it would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to
put the two races on the same plane.19 Essentially, the Court believed
that segregation was created in favor of minorities because it would
not be fair to combine them with a race that was far more superior. 20
As outrageous as the Court holding is in Plessy, the “separate but

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 538.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 553.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 548.
19 Id. at 552-53.
20
Id. at 552
13
14
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equal” doctrine was not overturned until 1954.21 This doctrine became
the driving force for making constitutional all laws that
compartmentalized people based on their color and showed great
favoritism to white citizens. Most importantly for this paper is how
the “separate but equal” doctrine led to the establishment of de jure
segregation in American schools.
It was not until 1954 that the Supreme Court of the United
States finally overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine stating de
jure segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.22 In Brown I,
several class action suits were filed by African-American children
who wished to be able to attend school on a non-segregated basis in
four different states.23 Each class of plaintiffs argued that they were
denied access to schools attended by white children under state laws
which permitted segregation according to race and argued that those
laws violated the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.24 At the trial court level for three of the four
class suits, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs relief on the “separate
but equal” doctrine, stating that so long as the races were provided
substantially equal facilities, it did not matter that people were being
separated by race.25 In Delaware, the judge still adhered to the
“separate but equal doctrine” but stated that the black students
needed to be admitted into the white-only schools because the schools
the black students were attending were far inferior to the white
children’s schools.26 The specific issue before the Court was whether
segregating children on the sole basis of race deprives children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities even if the
facilities are considered “equal.”27 Chief Justice Warren, writing for
the majority, held “separate but equal” deprived minority children
the right to equal education.28 He further stated that segregating
schools made children in the minority races feel inferior to their white
counterparts, and that sense of inferiority hindered the black
21

Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.
Id.
23 Id. at 489
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 493.
28 Id.
22
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children’s motivation to learn and slowed their mental
development.29 The Court overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine
in the school systems and found that the segregated school systems
deprived the plaintiffs their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection.30
One year later, in Brown II, the Court established that school
districts had the constitutional duty to desegregate their schools.31
Unfortunately, almost sixty years after the Court’s holding in Brown
II, many school districts who had desegregated were once again resegregated and many never did desegregate. 32The departure from de
jure segregation was a slow one and one that was done with great
reluctance by many states. It became obvious to state legislatures and
court systems that one court holding was not going to be enough to
erase centuries of animosity and discrimination.
The harsh reality of school systems today is that the dual
system of segregation still exists, but now, it is de facto segregation
rather than de jure segregation that separates students. De facto
segregation is segregation that occurs without state authority on the
basis of socioeconomic factors.33 There are many theories as to what
has caused the de facto segregation phenomenon, most of which will
be discussed later in this article when discussing the different
measures that have been taken by states and school systems to
attempt to remedy de facto segregation. For now, the important thing
to understand is that although state constitutions no longer have
provisions requiring separate schools for separate races, children,
especially African-American children, are still suffering from the
harmful effects of segregation.34 De facto segregation is a malady in
this country and until we find a cure, children are going to continue to

Id. at 494.
Id. at 495.
31 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [“Brown II”].
32 John M. Jackson, Remedy for Inner City Segregation in Public Schools: The
Necessary Inclusion of Suburbia, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 416 (1994).
33 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
34 See Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools 211-249
(1991).
29
30
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be victims to the psychological ramifications that come with being
classified and separated because of the color of their skin.35

PART II: DE FACTO SEGREGATION IN KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE
Although there are numerous psychological studies that prove
that people are generally drawn to people they have the most in
common with, the reality is having a school that is predominantly one
race over another forces children in the minority race to withdraw, act
out, and fail to reach their full potential.36 This article concentrates on
high schools in Knox County, Tennessee to demonstrate the harmful
effects of children, especially African-American children, being
educated in a school system divided by de facto segregation. There
are fourteen high schools in Knox County. Below is a compilation of
data retrieved from U.S. News and World Report on the performance
levels of the fourteen high schools in Knox County in 2011:
School

% Economically
Disadvantaged
Students

Proficient in
English

Proficient in
Algebra

Austin East High/Magnet School
Bearden High School
Carter High School
Central High School
Farragut High School
Fulton High School
Gibbs High School
Halls High School
Hardin Valley High School
Karns High School
Powell High School
Ridgedale Alternative School
South Doyle High School
West High School

83%
17%
46%
47%
9%
69%
33%
23%
15%
33%
30%
80%
49%
42%

31%
87%
66%
60%
89%
48%
59%
73%
81%
66%
69%
N/A
59%
69%

18%
60%
38%
25%
71%
23%
26%
58%
56%
32%
37%
N/A
36%
31%

Id.
Mary N. Parker, et al., Minority Status Stress: Effect on the Psychological and
Academic Functioning of African-American Students; Journal of Gender,
Culture, and Health 61, 62 (1999).
35
36
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School

% College
Readiness

% White
Students

%Minority
Students

Geographical
Setting

Austin East High/Magnet School

5.80%

10%

90%

City

Bearden High School

26.30%

85%

15%

City

Carter High School

8.90%

90%

10%

Rural

Central High School

7.90%

72%

28%

City

Farragut High School

38.70%

84%

16%

Suburb

Fulton High School

3.90%

59%

41%

City

Gibbs High School

2.90%

92%

8%

Suburb

Halls High School

13.80%

96%

4%

Suburb

Hardin Valley High School

25.80%

85%

15%

City

Karns High School

18.30%

85%

15%

Rural

Powell High School
Ridgedale Alternative School
South Doyle High School

9.7%
N/A
5.7%

88%
66%
85%

12%
34%
15%

Suburb
City
Suburb

West High School

23.3%

66%

34%

City

Table

Continued37

Of the fourteen schools listed, only Farragut High School is
ranked fifth in the state and is 705th in the nation.38 The only other
ranked school on this list is Bearden, which is eleventh in the state
and nationally ranked at 1,303rd.39 This chart indicates two things: 1)
the poverty rate with correlates high percentages of minorities in
schools; and 2) the highest concentration of minority students are in
the city limits of Knoxville. Without further looking into the
information provided in the chart, it shows Knox County high schools
are operating under de facto segregation. These data are not
conclusive, and there are many factors that contribute to the success
of students in any given school. Nevertheless, the data is clear that
students in schools where the number of minority students is greater
than the number of white students are at a significant disadvantage
(for the most part) than students in the schools where the white
student population was higher than the minority population. The
37

U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011.
www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/tennessee/districts/knoxcounty/(last visited Oct. 27, 2012). *The L&N Stem Academy was not
included in the school report; therefore I did not include it in my study.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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only school with an almost-balanced student ratio was Fulton, with
one of the lowest college readiness scores. After reading several
articles about Fulton’s strides to reform its school system to bring that
readiness score up, it is clear that those changes will be reflected in
years to come.40
Based on the information in the graph, the two schools on
polar opposites of each other are Farragut and Austin East. Of the
sixteen percent of minority students in Farragut, only six percent are
black. Seven percent are Asian and three percent are Hispanic. The
poverty level in Farragut is the lowest of all the fourteen high schools
in Knox County.41 Farragut has a history of being known as one the
wealthiest parts of Knox County. On the other hand, Austin East has a
long history of being a predominantly black school located in
Knoxville’s inner city. Austin East has a bad reputation of violence
and drugs and is more noted for its need for police escorts at its home
football games than for its academic achievements.42 Looking at the
scores and percentages in the chart, it can be determined that students
at Austin East are receiving an inferior education than the students in
Farragut: an example of de facto segregation at play.43
The numbers do not lie. The Knox County School District is
one with a dual system. Although there are small percentages of
minority students in other schools, the highest concentration of black
students can be found in Fulton High School and Austin East High
School, the district’s city schools. These schools have the lowest test
scores in the district. The scores are not the result of a high
concentration of slow-minded students who struggle to mentally
grasp educational concepts. Instead, these scores arguably are the
result of students having to learn in an environment where they are
told that because they are minorities and attend a nearly all-minority
See, e.g., Lydia X. McCoy, Making the Grade: Knox Schools Innovate, Score
Well on State Report Card, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2011, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/dec/02/making-the-grade-knoxschools-innovate-score-on/.
41
U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 34.
42 Megan Boehnke & Lydia X. McCoy, Gun Violence, Close Calls at Knox-area
Schools, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2012, available at
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/dec/21/east-tennessee-schoolviolence-and-close-calls/.
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school, they will not be allowed the educational opportunities that
students in majority-white schools have.44 De facto segregation is
detrimental to America’s students. The question becomes: how is de
facto segregation eliminated without violating the Constitution?

PART III: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF DE FACTO
SEGREGATION
So, what caused this de facto segregation or re-segregation to
occur? There are many theories as to what caused this phenomenon of
highly concentrated students of one race in schools, but they all lead
back to what is commonly known as “white flight.”45 With white
flight, white citizens left the cities they once populated and moved
out to the suburbs in large concentrations while black citizens stayed
in the cities.46 When new schools were built, they were placed in
heavily populated neighborhoods of one race or another, which
helped to keep the suburban children and urban children separated.47
Naturally, the poorer districts are found in urban communities
because of the lack of public transportation between the suburbs and
the city, the higher cost for housing and taxes in the suburbs, and the
government’s placement of federal housing projects in the cities
rather than the surrounding suburban districts.48 Thus, the inner-city
schools have a much higher population of students below the poverty
line than those in most suburban communities.49 As seen in the chart
in Part II of this article, often times where there is a high concentration
of poverty, there is also a high concentration of minorities.50 Because it
is reportedly known that poverty affects overall student achievement,
the high concentration of poverty juxtaposed with a high
concentration of minorities creates an environment that restricts
students’ learning achievements and feeds into the thought process
44

See e.g., Lucis Miron, Education, Inner-City Schools, Encyclopedia of Social
Problems, 284-285 (2008).
45 See e.g., Jan Blakeslee, “White Flight” to the Suburbs: A Demographic Approach,
Institute for Research on Poverty (1978).
46 Id.
47 ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM , BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 252 (2002).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 31.
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that inner-city schools are far more inferior to those located in the
suburbs.51

PART IV: REMEDIES FOR DE FACTO SEGREGATION
A. TYPES OF REMEDIES, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, AND THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSES
Americans may not have the constitutional right to an
education, but they do have the constitutional right to an equal
education.52 Brown I and Brown II should have been the cases to
dissolve all segregation problems in schools. They represent the
pivotal point in America’s history where the highest court in the
country declared that to be racially divided in our school systems was
unconstitutional. It gave hope to those who had once believed that
there was no hope.53 It sent a message to the world that America was
a progressive and moving nation.54 However, although the Supreme
Court declared dual school systems unconstitutional and mandated
that all segregated systems integrate, both cases had one major flaw:
they failed to mention how the schools needed to desegregate and left
it up to the District Courts to determine the appropriate remedies. As
Chief Justice Burger explained it in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education:
This Court, in Brown I, appropriately dealt with the
large constitutional principles; other federal courts had
to grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of dayto-day implementation of those constitutional
commands. Their efforts, of necessity, embraced a
process of ‘trial and error,’ and our effort to formulate
guidelines must take into account their experience.55

Misty Lacour & Laura D. Tissington, The Effects of Poverty on Academic
Achievement, Educational Research and Reviews, Academic Journals, 522
(2011).
52 Id.
53 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy, Princeton U. P. (2000).
54 Id.
55 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
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Because the Court failed to provide a remedy in Brown I and
Brown II for school systems and states to follow, states and school
boards alike spent the next sixty years trying to find the perfect
remedy to resolve the segregation issues that was not racially
discriminatory or harmful to any students involved.56 Most of the
remedies have failed when they were challenged at the federal court
level.57 Many parents believed the school systems were not doing
enough.58 Others believed the school systems were becoming too
intrusive in their children’s lives.59 It rapidly became clear that merely
declaring something that had been practiced for centuries
unconstitutional was not going to be enough.60
Today, school districts must show the correlation between the
legitimate interest and the means for achieving said interest.61 The test
to determine the constitutionality of desegregation plans is one of
strict scrutiny, which requires that the state or school district show
that their system has been narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.62 Thus, a heavy burden is placed on a school
district to establish it does have a compelling government interest in
desegregation plans and that the method in which it used is narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose. This is important to understanding
how proposed desegregation methods have been accepted or denied
by the Courts and how the strict standard has contributed to the racial
imbalance in schools today.
1. BUSING AND RESTRUCTURING SCHOOL ZONES
Once Brown I and Brown II were decided, they did not change
the fact most schools in states operating under dual systems were still
racially divided.63 The question became how to make the students
See Jonathan Fischbach, et. al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of RaceBased Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in
Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 491 (2008).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 702 (2007).
62 Id.
63 Armor, supra note 36.
56
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integrate so that it was obvious the state and school board were
taking steps to desegregate the system. The most popular method of
desegregation was the busing method.64
Under the busing method, which involved the restructuring of
school zones in an effort to achieve racial balance in that district’s
schools, public transportation was provided to bus students to the
school they had been assigned to in an effort to achieve racial balance.
65 The school district to make history under this method was the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district in North Carolina, a state that
formerly had a statutory dual segregated school system.66 Out of its
84,000 pupils, 21,000 of the 24,000 black children in its district
attended schools within the city of Charlotte; 14,000 of those students
attended 21 schools which were either all-black or more than 99% allblack.67 The school board was ordered by the District Court to come
up with a plan based on geographic zoning with a free-transfer
provision to make the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district racially
balanced.68
Two plans were proposed: the Board Plan and the Finger
Both plans had a similar proposal for high school students but
varied for the junior high and elementary school students.70 The
common denominator in both plans was to eliminate several all-black
schools and relocate those students to other schools in the district in
order to make the minority ratio in each school reflect the minority
ratio in the school district as a whole.71 The Finger Plan was adopted,
but it had one major flaw: only white students in the fifth and sixth
grades were bused to schools in the inner city.72 From kindergarten to
fourth grade and from seventh grade to twelfth grade, black students
Plan.69

David J. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PUBLIC INTEREST 28 (1972).
402 U.S. at 8.
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were bused to predominantly white schools in the suburbs of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district.73
Unfortunately, when the constitutionality of the busing and
rezoning system was challenged before the United States Supreme
Court, the majority of the Court upheld the busing and rezoning
method as a necessary means to cure the problem of segregation in
the school system.74 It appears that the Burger Court chose to believe
that busing white students in the fifth and sixth grade along with
establishing a unitary athletic department was enough to prove that
the school board’s system was constitutionally sound.75 The Court
found that the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy; thus, because the school board system was taking strides to
make itself racially balanced, striking down the system would not be
an effective remedy when the school board was trying to uphold its
constitutional duty.76
The rezoning and busing system was further challenged in
Milliken v. Bradley.77 In this case, parents of children in the Detroit city
school system challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan statute
known as Act 48 of the 1970 Legislature, which would interfere with a
voluntary partial segregation plan for high schools in Detroit which
was racially imbalanced.78 The Supreme Court in this case read Swann
to say that desegregation does not require racial balance in schools.79
The problem at issue in this case was that the schools in the city of
Detroit were 85%-100% predominantly black schools that operated
under the dual school system, whereas the surrounding 53 school
districts had made changes to operate under a unitary school
system.80
The District Court sought to remedy the racial imbalance in
Detroit by forcing a busing and rezoning plan on the surrounding
Id.
Id. at 33.
See Id.
76 Id. at 16.
77 418 U.S. 717, 722 (1974).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 740-41.
80 Id. at 722.
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school districts in order to make Detroit’s city school system
balanced.81 The Burger Court declared that when one district is in
violation of the Constitution in operating under a dual system, the
surrounding districts should not be punished as a result.82 Essentially,
the Court placed limitations on the rezoning and busing practice
approved in Swann.83 As Justice Marshall stated in his dissenting
opinion, the Court held that if the state failed to prove the
surrounding districts played a part in the segregation of a single
district, said districts would not be forced to rezone to accommodate
or fix the segregation problem of another district.84 He believed that
the majority opinion would stunt segregation challenges because it
would not allow for addressing the discrepancies between one school
district and the surrounding school districts.85
After Milliken, it appeared the rezoning and busing remedies
within school districts were remedial methods approved by the
Supreme Court, but over time, it would become evident those
programs only further supported segregation and fueled the fire to
rapid de facto segregation in our country.86 In 1997, the decision in
Swann was challenged when a district judge declared that the school
system had achieved unitary status and the busing system was no
longer necessary to achieve racial balance.87 As a result, the school
system implemented a racial-neutral choice plan where students were
allowed to pick the school of their choice.88 Today, the CharlotteMecklenburg school district is just as racially divided as it was before
Swann was decided.89
As for the Detroit city schools, the holding in Milliken
allowed for further white flight to take place and according to the
most recent reported data, 90% of the students in Detroit Public
Schools are black or Hispanic while the schools in the surrounding
Id. at 752.
Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 Id.
86 Claire Apaliski & Laura Simmons, Mapping de facto segregation in CharlotteMecklenburg Schools, UNC Charlotte Urban Institute (2010).
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suburb districts are predominantly white.90 Thus, it would appear the
busing system and school zoning were effective methods in
integrating schools. However, as will be discussed below, the
Supreme Court later held that using race for the basis of determining
where a student attends school also violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.91
2. FREEDOM OF CHOICE
Originally after the decisions in Brown I and Brown II, school
districts adopted a method known as freedom of choice.92 Under the
freedom of choice approach, students were allowed to choose which
school they wanted to attend.93 This was an attempt made by school
boards to achieve racially balanced schools without using race as a
factor.94
This system was challenged in the case of Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County, Virginia. In this case, Virginia had
once conducted its schools under statutory segregation, but after the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown II, Virginia enacted first what was
known as the Pupil Placement Act in 1964.95 Under Pupil Placement,
students were automatically reassigned to the school previously
attended unless they applied to attend another school.96 The problem
with Pupil Placement was that no minority applied for admission to
the white school under the statute and no white child had applied to
the minority school. Before any action could be taken to strike down
the Pupil Placement Act, the New Kent school board adopted a
“freedom of choice” plan to desegregate schools.97 Under the freedom
of choice plan, students not entering in first and eighth grade could
choose between the previously all-white school or the previously allblack school and any student who did not choose a school would be
Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E
Pluribus…Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, The Civil
Rights Project at the UCLA 44 (2008).
91 See 402 U.S. at 8.
92 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 433.
97 Id.
90
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placed in the school he or she previously attended.98 This plan seemed
great to the school board because it placed the responsibility of
integration on the students. However, the problem with the freedom
of choice method in this school district was that after three years of its
implementation, no white child had chosen to attend the formerly allblack school and although 15% of the black children enrolled into the
formerly white-only school, 85% of the black children still attended
the all-black school.99 Thus, the schools system remained
segregated.100
The problem with the freedom of choice method is that when
children have the freedom to choose, they will choose the most
familiar option. Without further action from the school board, the
negative stigma the all-black school originally carried will remain,
regardless of whether students are suddenly able to pick the school
they want to attend.101 The school district must take an additional step
to show that both schools provide an equal education regardless of
whatever prior negative label that school once held. The Supreme
Court found in Green that New Kent’s freedom of choice plan was an
insufficient step to an integrated school system.102 However
insufficient New Kent’s freedom of choice plan was, the Court did not
go as far as to declare “freedom of choice” programs unconstitutional.
The most well-known freedom of choice plan enacted by the
federal government is found in the No Child Left Behind Act, enacted
in 2001, which contains a provision allowing for minority students in
predominantly black schools to transfer to predominantly white
schools in an attempt to remedy de facto segregation.103 Many school
districts have decided to forgo this remedial procedure, and as a
result de facto segregation is becoming more of a reality as students in
predominantly white schools choose to stay in their schools while

Id.
Id. at 441.
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students in predominantly black or Hispanic schools are forced to
remain where they are in the inner city.104
3. RACIALLY-BASED SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT PLANS
Until 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
any desegregation plans that used race as a basis of assigning
students to schools so long as the school boards could establish that it
was necessary in eliminating its former dual school system.105 In
addition, schools had to show there were other factors or actions
taken by the school district, which made it so that race was not the
only factor in the school desegregation plan.106 Racially based school
assignment plans involved a school district looking at the number of
students in each school within the district and reassigning the
children to different schools in order to achieve racial balance.107 This
practice was challenged by parents of students in Seattle School
District No. 1. Under the program established in Seattle School
District No. 1, a student reassignment plan was created in which
certain slots in oversubscribed schools were allocated based on racial
classification.108 The parents argued the race-based assignment plan
violated their children’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection.109 Chief Justice Roberts, writing the majority opinion
concerning the race classification, stated that:
[b]ecause ‘racial classifications are simply too
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection
between justification and classification,’ governmental
distributions of burdens or benefits based on
individual racial classifications are reviewed under
strict scrutiny. Thus, the school districts must
demonstrate that their use of such classifications is

See Debroah Meier et al., Many Children Left Behind: How the No Child Left
Behind Act is Damaging Our Children and Our Schools 6-15 (2004).
105 See generally Seattle Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701.
106 See 402 U.S. at 8.
107 Id.
108 Seattle Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 701.
109 Id.
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“narrowly tailored” to
government interest.110

achieve

a

“compelling”

Following the strict scrutiny test, Chief Justice Roberts found
that Seattle School District No. 1 failed to meet the standard due to the
fact Seattle schools were never segregated by law; thus the compelling
interest to remedy past intentional segregation did not exist.111 The
Court also found the school district was not governed by Grutter v.
Bolinger because the positions allocated in the oversubscribed schools
were purely based on race.112 In order for Grutter to apply, the
spectrum needed to be broader so race and ethnicity were mere
factors rather than the entire basis for the desegregation policy.113 The
Court further stated if a school’s desegregation decree has been
dissolved, a racially based system of assigning students to schools
after the dissolution of the decree is unconstitutionally discriminatory
absent some showing by the school district or the state that there was
a separate compelling interest for using race as a factor in assigning
students to a school.114
The impact of the Court’s holding in Seattle School District No.
1 was devastating for school districts across the country.115 The strict
scrutiny test now applied to public schools has debilitated many
programs that were meant to help achieve racial balance in schools.116
There are two types of schools in this country: the schools that were
never segregated and the schools that once practiced segregation but
have since been dissolved of their desegregation decrees.117 As a
result, Seattle School District No. 1 has declared unconstitutional racebased assignments in school districts that had been in place to
maintain racial balance, which means these schools must find another
way to stop the rapidly growing trend of de facto segregation.118 In
Id. at 702.
Id.
112
Id.at 703.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Craig R. Heeren, “Together at the Table of Brotherhood” Voluntary Student
Assignment Plants and the Supreme Court, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133
(2008).
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going back to the chart in Section II, if the problem is that 90% of a
school district’s minority population attends one school while 90% of
its white population attends another school, how does that school
district blend the schools so that 50% of each group of people attends
both schools without using race as a factor? My answer to that
question will be discussed in the Part V of this article.
4. “COLORBLINDNESS”
“Colorblindness” is a theory introduced by “integrationalists”
who believe that in order to overcome racism, America must first be a
racially-neutral society. 119 At this time, colorblindness is only a school
of thought that many people would like to see implemented in an
effort to achieve a culturally balanced society.120 Although the
methods of integration discussed below have not been implemented
in schools at this time, and thus have not been addressed by the
Courts, I found it important to include in this section of the article to
show the potential remedies and the potential problems the methods
of colorblind integration face. Integrationalists’ cure for
discrimination is “equal treatment according to neutral norms.”121
There are three forms of integration under the “colorblind” theory:
amalgamation, accommodationalism, and assimilationism.122
Amalgamation, or cultural pluralism, permits diverse
cultures the right to keep their individual
characteristics while allowing them to have equal
access to resources in society.123 This system relies on
each member in American society acting racially
neutral in identifying other members in society as is
described below:
Amalgamation thus embraces the belief that each
member of American society can determine the extent
that another member's race will factor into their
Alicia L. Mioli, Sheff v. O'neill: The Consequence of Educational Table-Scraps
for Poor Urban Minority Schools, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1916-17 (2000).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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relationships and identifications so long as the second
member's “race would not be used . . . to limit [his]
opportunities or define [his] identit[y].” Through
meshing different cultures together, including African
American culture, American society thus reaps the
benefits of multiculturalism and those of integration at
the same time. Consequently, the amalgamationist
could, in theory, preserve African American
heritage.124

Thus, in my opinion, the problem with amalgamation is it
could further preserve the cultural divide between white society and
black society, thus keeping us right where we are: never moving
forward; always staying the same.
Accommodationalism calls for “accepting the value of
dominant society and working toward eliminating racial inequalities
gradually.”125 This form of integration trades the more aggressive
approach for one that requires conforming to the expectations of the
white majority.126 Accommodationists in support of this form of
integration believe if black people conform to white culture, it will
gradually make white people more open to integration.127 The
problem with this is it conforms to the stereotype that black people
are inferior to white people and calls for African Americans to
disregard their distinct culture to conform to the culture of the
majority.128
Under assimilationism, no racial culture is different from any
other American, thus all races should adopt the cultural norms and
values of the “American majority.”129 Essentially, what
assimilationism calls for is not recognizing any culture as distinct or
different and recognizing that everyone can compete equally before
and after integration.130 Although this is great in theory, the problem
with assimilationism, in my opinion, is defining just what is
Id. at 1917-18.
Id. at 1918.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1919.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
124
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considered the culture of “American majority” in a nation where the
minorities in the country are seeing a major increase in population
number while the number of white people is shrinking. Which culture
is the one we must conform to or is there something in between the
two?
It is my theory that the major flaw of these schools of thought
regarding integration is they all rely on society to step up and fix the
de facto segregation problem by itself. The problem with this is so far,
we are not doing a good job on our own. Taking a step back and
looking at the layout of schools today, it is hard not to ask the
question, “Is this really the government’s fault or is the segregation in
our communities caused by something more?”
B. THE MAIN OBSTACLES SCHOOLS FACE TODAY IN RESOLVING
THE ISSUE OF DE FACTO SEGREGATION
What are the schools doing differently, if anything at all, that
is affecting the learning outcomes of students in inner-city schools
where 90% of the student population is black or Hispanic versus the
learning outcomes of students in predominantly white suburban
schools?
That racial division by itself is no longer the issue. The two
main obstacles schools face today in attempting to achieve a
successful and balanced learning environment are poverty and lack of
parental involvement. The problem with inner-city schools today is
where there is a high concentration of minorities; there is also a high
concentration of poverty.131 Studies have shown that racial
segregation combined with poverty results in a negative impact on
the quality of education.132 As a result, low-income minority students
in inner-city schools are more often receiving inferior educations than
students coming from upper and middle classes attending schools in
NAT’L CENTER FOR ED. STATISTICS, Percentage of high school dropouts
among persons 16 through 24 years old (status dropout rate), by income
level, and percentage distribution of status dropouts, by labor force status
and educational attainment: 1970 through 2010,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_117.asp., (last
visited Oct. 27, 2011).
132 Mioli, supra note 104.
131

206

1 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2014)

the suburbs.133 Inferior education includes less-qualified teachers,
insufficient supply of books and access to technology for students,
poorly maintained schools, and lack of valuable learning tools such as
writing labs and science labs, AP courses, and extracurricular
programs such as photography or newspaper staff.134 The inevitable
result of an inferior education is below-average student achievement,
as was seen in the student proficiency scores in Knox County high
schools in 2011.135
Austin East, an inner-city school, with 90% minority
enrollment and 83% of its students being economically disadvantaged
is only 31% proficient in English and 18% proficient in Algebra.136 On
the other hand, Farragut, with 10% minority enrollment and 9% of its
students being economically disadvantaged, is 89% proficient in
English and 71% proficient in Algebra.137 The average proficiency
percentages in Knox County high schools is 66% in English and 39%
in Algebra, which means Austin East’s student achievement is well
below the county average in both subjects.138
After a visit at both Farragut High School and Austin East
High School, I can conclude students at Austin East are receiving a far
inferior education to those at Farragut High School.139 In Austin East,
many of the ceiling tiles in the hallway showed signs of water stains,
the lighting was poor, the lockers were older and scratched, and only
the basic extracurricular activities are available although student
involvement in those programs is significantly less than the number
of students enrolled in the school.140 In Farragut, the lighting was
much brighter in the hallways, the lockers had been repainted over
summer break, each student had textbooks for every subject, AP and
college courses were available to advanced students, and students
Id.
Id.
135 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 31.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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139 At both schools, I spoke with the administration about government
assistance and the turn-over rate of teachers in each school. We also
discussed parental involvement and the socioeconomic status of the
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had access to extracurricular activities beyond the standard
band/chorus/sports activities, which included Navy JROTC, German
Club, Technology Student Association, Walking Team, Robotics
Team, Admiral’s Performing Arts Company, DECA, FHS Book Club,
FHS ClubKnit, Humanities Academy, and Health Occupation
Students of America.141
Normally, schools rely heavily on fundraiser money to pay for
updating equipment or expanding on a certain department in the
school.142 Students generally limit selling their fundraiser items to
people in their communities, which means students in povertystricken inner-city schools will underperform in sales because of the
lack of money in the community.143 Whereas the schools in the
suburbs will typically meet or surpass their fundraiser goal because
even if money is tight, members in their community still have enough
to give to their school children.144 As the person I spoke to at Austin
East explained, although the school receives Title 1 funds from the
government to go towards updating technology, in a community with
limited funds, it is almost impossible to have anything beyond what
the Title 1 money covers.145 As a result, students attending schools
with high poverty rates are receiving an inferior education because
the school cannot afford to provide the additional money needed to
fund new programs and update the facilities.146 Poverty is an obstacle
for remedying de facto segregation because students from lowincome families will be more dependent on the school system to
provide their food and transportation to and from school.147 This in
turn causes a higher financial burden on the school district and
subsequently makes schools more reluctant to change the program in
any way that would cause them to have to spend more money
transporting these children even further to other schools in an effort
to achieve racial balance.

Id.
Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Mioli, supra note 104.
141
142

208

1 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2014)

The second, and probably the most important, obstacle
hindering the reversal of de facto segregation is a lack of parental
involvement. It is unfair to place the burden of student achievement
solely on teachers and the school administration since a good
education begins at home.148 Statistics have shown that students who
have at least one parent actively involved in encouraging and
promoting their education have a higher success rate in school than
those who have little or no parental involvement.149 Unfortunately, in
urban schools, parental involvement is extremely low.150 The
contributing factors to low parental involvement are culture, income,
language, and the parents’ perceptions of what a student’s
responsibilities are to school and their families.151 As mentioned
above, schools with higher percentages of economically
disadvantaged students generally provide an inferior education. 152
Poverty also affects parental involvement.153 Middle class
parents generally take proactive roles in their children’s education
and try to work with the teachers in order to make sure their children
perform at their best.154 Low-income parents often see themselves as
separate and outside the school system and leave the responsibility of
teaching their children to the educators.155 Another problem with
schools with high poverty rates and minority rates is that parents
often do not feel valued by the schools, which means inner-city
schools must take greater strides in making parents in that school feel
welcome and important because often parents in these schools have
experienced exclusion in the community based on their income,
ethnicity, or culture.156

Peter McDermott & Julia Rothenberg, Why Urban Parents Resist
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The greatest hurdle for teachers in inner-city schools in trying
to improve parental involvement is communication.157 Studies show
that teachers who can match their communication styles to that of the
community in which they teach will be more successful in making
parents more eager to participate in their student’s education.158 Also,
teachers who educate themselves on their students’ cultures and
ethnicities will be able to further encourage more parental
involvement.159 Unfortunately, most teachers in inner-city schools do
not communicate effectively because they have failed to educate
themselves about the cultures and beliefs of their students, which
results in the parents feeling as if the school system was created to
cater to middle-class white Americans.160
In an interview with a teacher from a predominantly Hispanic
populated middle school in East Tennessee, I was able to learn that
often the hardest thing to overcome in getting students motivated to
learn was getting parents to believe that education was important for
their children.161 The teacher, who has been certified English as a
Second Language (ESL) instructor in the state of Tennessee for three
years now, stated,
It’s really hard to get students motivated to take school
seriously when they go home to a culture that says
education isn’t necessary for success. When I try to
schedule meetings with the parents to discuss how
their child is failing, I may get lucky and have one
parent show up but most of the time they don’t show.
Overall, because of the lack of parental support at home, teachers like
the one I interviewed are limited in what they can do to encourage
student achievement in schools that are predominantly black or
Hispanic. This ultimately results in higher levels of teacher turnovers
because the teachers feel like it is impossible to mend a broken system
Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 The teacher I interviewed wished to remain anonymous in order to be
able adequately answer my questions and still protect her students’
identities.
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that does not want to be fixed and their job security relies on students’
performances on the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program
Test (TCAP Test).162 “It’s simple,” the ESL teacher said,
without the pressure of losing our jobs over our
students’ performance on the TCAP, I think you’d see
more teachers willing to work in inner-city schools. As
it stands, we can’t afford to stay in schools where there
is little parental involvement and little to no resources
available for us to provide that next level of
education.163
Contrarily, in Hartford, Connecticut, parents in racially
divided city schools have decided to take an active role in their
children’s education.164 Rather than asking for integration, they are
asking that their children receive the same education as children in
the surrounding suburban schools.165 Most states have websites to
promote and encourage parental involvement in their urban school
districts and it is clear that more parents are starting to take active
roles in their children’s education.166 According to the American
Council on Education, “students with involved parents, no matter
what their income or background, are more likely to earn higher
grades and test scores, attend school regularly, have better social
skills, show improved behavior, and adapt well to school and
graduate and go on to post-secondary education.”167 If parents do not
make education a priority in their children’s lives, no remedy in the
world will be enough to provide equal education for all.168
De facto segregation was not merely the result of poor
governmental attempts at eliminating formerly segregated school
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166 See e.g., Cypress Fairbanks Independent School District, www.cfisd.net
(last visited Sept. 3, 2014); see also www.marylandpublicschools.org (last
visited Dec. 12, 2012).
167 American Council on Education (2007).
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systems.169 A state can find the most nondiscriminatory method in
balancing its schools, but the obstacles of poverty and lack of parental
involvement will ultimately reverse any attempts on the state’s part to
increase student academic achievement if not properly addressed.170
PART V: HOW TO REMEDY THE ISSUE OF DE FACTO SEGREGATION
By this point, the foundation has been laid as to why de facto
segregation is a problem in our school districts today. Although de
facto segregation was not statutorily created by the states, it was
encouraged by Court holdings and governmental action.171 We drifted
away from constitutional segregation to integration but the trend
continued re-segregation where the original boundary lines returned
and schools are just as racially divided now as they were before Brown
I and II were ever decided. The problem does not rest on the fact that
there are schools with predominantly one race over the other. The
problem is, where there is a high concentration of nonwhite students
in inner city schools, there is also a high concentration of poverty in
those schools.172 Poverty combined with racial division and lack of
parental involvement creates the perfect storm of student failure.173
Parents have attempted to challenge the constitutionality of de facto
segregation and demand that states take proactive measures in
balancing schools racially as was seen in Seattle Dist. No. 1 , but
because the racial divide resulted from demographic shifts allegedly
beyond the government’s control, systems remain as they are for the
time being.174 So then, what is the solution?
One single act alone will not be enough to create a multiethnic
learning environment. Instead, several events must take place in
order to encourage re-integration. First, the government should
provide a teaching program that will not only forgive a teacher’s
student loans if he or she will teach in an inner-city school for five
years, but also protect any teacher under this program from
termination on the sole basis of students’ performances on the TCAP
Armor, supra note 36.
Henderson, supra note 151.
171 See, e.g., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
172 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 31.
173 Henderson, supra note 163.
174 Armor, supra note 36.
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Test (or whatever government standard aptitude test may be in place
at that time) during those five years so that all involved can focus
more on addressing the special needs of their students rather than
teaching to a test.
Second, school boards need to devise a program which assigns
students to schools based on income so there is an equal number of
each income class in each school within the district. The Supreme
Court has held poverty is not a class protected by the strict scrutiny
test.175 Thus, spreading out students in order to achieve economic
balance would not be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.176
However, the state’s actions cannot interfere with a fundamental
right, and it must be able to show the system bears some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes,177 and rezoning the school
districts is a direct relationship to the state’s interest in providing
equal education to all its students. The rezoning will result in creating
a more racially balanced school system because inevitably, when
more upper and middle class students are placed in inner-city schools
and more low-income students are placed in the suburban schools,
the high concentration of low-income minority students in the innercity schools will be evened out in the process.
To avoid singling out a student based on his or her family’s
income, the districts in the county will be rezoned so that each school
has an equal ratio of suburban and urban students. This will prevent
students from being bused from opposite ends of the county in order
to achieve economic balance. The government can show it has a
compelling state interest in rezoning school districts in order to
resolve economic imbalances that drain the state’s educational
budget. If money is not being significantly concentrated in one school
over another because of the heightened need for governmental
assistance, more money can be spent on updating the school’s
resources and creating new teaching positions to meet the needs of
the students.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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Third, to persuade parents in suburban schools to be in favor
of the new zoning plan, the former negative stigma from which inner
city schools suffer needs to be eliminated. This will most likely be the
most difficult task to achieve, but it can be done. If parents are
assured their children will have the same access to all the resources
they had in their suburban school when they move to the inner city
school, they will be much more supportive of the transition. To
achieve that goal, all schools need updated facilities and technology,
writing labs, science labs, extracurricular activities that challenge
students and provide them with outlets to harvest and channel their
gifts and talents, and options to take AP and college-level courses. If
students are guaranteed to receive a well-rounded liberal arts
education, that will prepare them for college in every school, and
parents will likely support the rezoning program. Schools will have a
fresh start with teachers ready to take on the challenge of teaching a
wide array of students, and students will be exposed to the invaluable
experience of learning in a multicultural environment.
Fourth, a new program will need to be implemented in each
school that will create a forum for parents so they can express
concerns within the school without the structured organization that
generally comes with the PTO or PTA. In this program, parents meet
with their child’s teacher in a small-group setting at least once a
month, and the teacher will provide the parents with a syllabus of
what the students will be learning in the next month and how the
parents can help them in those subjects. Meetings will be arranged so
ESL teachers can attend all meetings where there are parents who do
not speak English or English is their second language so there is
always someone at the meetings who can communicate and translate
for them.
Next, schools will need to be structured in a way to encourage
cultural differences. Teachers and school administrators will be
educated in the cultures and beliefs of their students in order to be
equipped with knowing the best way to reach the children. This will
require a school system where students are taught how to respect
themselves as well as others. There will be rules the students must
follow to will teach them structure and discipline which they will
need in order to succeed in life, but there will also be avenues for the
children to express themselves and learn how to use their different
cultures to give back to the community in a positive way. One day a
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week will be culture day where students will experience a new
culture represented by members of their own student body as well as
those not represented. The cafeteria will serve food from the culture,
and students from that cultural environment will be able to share
with their classmates something unique to their culture such as a type
of dance or a holiday tradition. This program will give students a
sense of pride in their culture while educating other students who
may not have been exposed to other cultures before attending that
school. Along with culture day, there would be an amended school
curriculum that would reflect the multicultural student body. This
involves incorporating art, history, and literature from the different
cultures into the curriculum.
Finally, each school will need to have a career program where
members of the community will come to the schools and educate
students about their careers and provide students with hands-on
experience in that field. Interested students can sign up for
internships in high school where they can shadow someone in the
career of their choice in order to gain the experience of being in a
working environment and learning what it takes to be able to do what
their mentor does. This will provide students with connections to the
community they might not have had before and will help them begin
deciding on a career path before graduating high school. Along with
the internship program there would be technical courses offered at
the high school level that will provide students who do not want to go
to college with the necessary tools they will need for the trade of their
choice. The school will work with the local trade schools to ensure the
classes have dual credit, and the students can graduate with the
necessary license in whatever field they studied. Establishing this
program in schools with the help of members in the community will
create an educational environment that is conducive to all learning
types so each student, regardless of race or income level, receives a
well-rounded education.
Of course, there are many flaws to my proposal, one being the
lack of funding. The proposal relies on members of the community
reaching out to help schools. It also does not take into account the
parents who do not wish to get involved or cannot get involved in
their child’s education for whatever reason. It also does not take into
consideration the increase in cost it will take to bus the children to
and from school. However, it is a plan that calls for action and focuses
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on wealth distribution rather than race in order to achieve diversity in
the classroom.
Success should not be based on the color of a person’s skin or
the size of his or her parent’s bank account. We all should have the
ability to achieve whatever goals we set for ourselves. With deep
racial divides in our school systems, we are stunting America’s ability
to move beyond the days after slavery was abolished and before the
Supreme Court made segregation unconstitutional. We now have the
resources available to heal racial division in our schools. It is time to
take action, and ensure a better and stronger future for the next
generation of students.

